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ELEVATION OF ENTRAPMENT
TO A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE
The issue of entrapment arises initially as a defense when a person is
accused of committing a criminal act in which government agents solic-
ited, and perhaps actively participated in, the conduct for which the de-
fendant stands accused. Classic entrapment situations occur when law
enforcement officers, through agents or informers, solicit an illegal trans-
action, such as the sale of contraband.' The evidence thereby obtained is
used to support the prosecution of the individual accepting the solicita-
tion. Solicitation is an important technique of law enforcement because
evidence of illegal transactions is often impossible to obtain 2 by other
methods. :' Certain uses of solicitation brought to the attention of the fed-
eral courts early in this century demonstrated the need for judicial limita-
tion by prescribed standards.' These cases involved factual settings where
officials, eager to obtain a person's conviction for a particular substantive
offense, seemingly "set him up" for prosecution by inducing him to par-
ticipate in an illegal transaction when it was questionable whether the ac-
cused would have taken part if unsolicited. When directing their solicita-
tion to this end, it is doubtful that enforcement officers are acting within
the limits of their legitimate functions. Moreover, there is a real possi-
bility that the government might attempt systematically to induce criminal
conduct in a politically or socially unpopular individual or group so as to
hamper their activities through prosecution or conviction.2 These situa-
I For example, a government informer solicited the sale of bootleg whiskey and
on the basis of this evidence the seller was prosecuted for the illegal sale of liquor.
United States v. Eddings, 478 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1973). In another case. government
agents solicited the sale of obscene matter through the mails by a known suspect and
the seller was then prosecuted under the postal laws. United States v. Becker. 62
F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933).
2Transactions in contraband goods, such as alcohol, narcotics, and counterfeit
currency, and other proscribed transactions, such as bribery or prostitution, are
normally "invisible" in the sense that no one is likely to know of their occurrence
except those who are direct participants. In these crimes there is no innocent victim
as a complaining witness or detached third party able to provide evidence. Partic-
ipants in such transactions have no incentive to produce self-implicative evidence.
3 See generally Rotenburg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragemtent. 49
VA. L. REV. 871 (1963).
4'See Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915) (An immigration offi-
cial suspected the defendant and others of unlawfully importing Chinese women into
the United States. He persuaded the defendant to bring certain Chinese women from
Mexico to the United States so that the defendant could be threatened with pro-
secution for this illegal act and thereby be persuaded to serve as an informer.):
United States v. Healey, 202 F. 349 (D. Mont. 1913) (An American Indian, acting
as an agent for the government, disguised himself as a Caucasian and purchased
liquor from the defendant's liquor store. The defendant was then prosecuted for
selling liquor to an Indian.).5 See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, Criminal No. 602-71 (D.N.J. May 20, 1973).
Defendants were members of a group of anti-Vietnam war activists who had planned
to break into an office of the Selective Service System and destroy draft board records.
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tions present considerable legal ambiguity with regard to the policy ob-
jectives the entrapment doctrine has been designed to promote, the ele-
ments of the defense as determined by these objectives, and the language
employed to describe the elements. It is not surprising, therefore, that a
sizable volume of judicial opinion and legal literature discusses the pos-
sible recognition of a bar to criminal conviction on the ground that the
alleged criminal conduct was induced by the police.
The orthodox entrapment doctrine expressed in the great majority of
federal cases 7 posits that if the alleged illegal conduct was induced by the
solicitation or other direct participation of law enforcement agents, and if
the accused was not predisposed to commit the crime charged when the
inducement took place, then the defendant should not be convicted. The
but gave up the plan for want of technical expertise. A paid FBI informer joined the
group, urged them to proceed with the idea, and provided them with a strategy,
tools and equipment, schematic diagrams of the draft board offices, a vehicle,
groceries, and technical training. Expenses were born by the FBI. With this assistance.
the defendants executed the plan and were caught in the act by FBI agents who were
lying in wait. The defendants were prosecuted for conspiracy to break and enter the
building and destroy the records.
The writer wishes to acknowledge the kind assistance of Mr. David Kairys of the
Philadelphia Bar and Mr. John J. Barry, Assistant United States Attorney for the
District of New Jersey, for helpful information concerning this case and the
theories of entrapment argued during its course.
0 See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lopez v. United States.
373 U.S. 427 (1963); Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958); Casey v. United
States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928); United States v. Workopich, 479 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Tatar, 439 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
866 (1971); United States v. Walton, 411 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1969); Notaro v. United
States, 363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966); Polski v. United States, 33 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.
1929); Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128 (4th Cir. 1924); Ritter v. United States,
293 F. 187 (9th Cir. 1923); Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35 (8th Cir. 1921). See also
Cowen, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal Courts, and Some State Court
Comparisons, 29 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 447 (1959); Groot, The Serpent Beguiled Me
and I (Without Scienter) Did Eat-Denial of Crime and the Entrapment Defense,
1973 U. ILL. L.F. 254; Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement:
Lewis v. United States and Beyond, 4 HOUSTON L. REV. 609 (1967); Williams, The
Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FORDHAM
L. REV. 399 (1959); Comment, Clearing the Path for an Entrapment Defense, 61
Ky. L.J. 833 (1973); Note, The Defense of Entrapment: A Plea for Constitutional
Standards, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 63 (1967); Current Development, The Defense of
Entrapment and the Due Process Analysis, 43 COLO. L. REV. 127 (1971); Comment,
Entrapment: A Critical Discussion, 73 Mo. L. REV. 633 (1972); Comment,
Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1 U.S.F.L. REV. 177 (1966); Comment, Present
and Suggested Limitations on the Use of Secret Agents and Informers in Law
Enforcement, 41 COLO. L. REV. 261 (1969).
7 See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 960 (1969); United States v. Pugliese, 346 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1965); United
States ex rel. Hall v. Illinois, 329 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1964); Gorin v. United States,
313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir. (1963); United States v. Kros, 296 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
The exceptions to the orthodox doctrine in the lower courts are found in: Greene v.
United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973); United States v. Arceneaux, 437
F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1971); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967);
United States v. Morrison, 349 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905
(1965); Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72 (1st Cir. 1963); Williamson v. United
States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1963); Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir.
1957); Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1933); United States v. Chisum,
312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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majority policy goal is defendant-oriented in that the court focuses on the
defendant's conduct and mental state rather than the conduct of enforce-
ment officials in inducing the criminal act. The defense is designed to
prevent conviction of the "unwary innocent" seduced to crime by a gov-
ernment solicitor, while preserving police solicitation or encouragement
practices directed at the "unwary criminal. '8
In recent years, however, a minority of courts considering the entrap-
ment issue have departed from the orthodox, or "subjective,"" rule. They
take the position that the entrapment doctrine is primarily concerned with
prevention of improper law enforcement practices. Under this view, the
focus of the entrapment defense should be the overreaching conduct of the
government. This "objective"' 0 test differs from the orthodox doctrine in
that a defendant who was predisposed to commit the crime would not neces-
sarily be precluded from successful assertion of the defense by reason of his
predisposition. The objective test is designed to place a judicial standard
of limitation on acceptable law enforcement conduct. In effectuating this
policy goal, the test does not discriminate between the innocence or crimi-
nality of the defendant's mental state as an element apart from the induce-
ment of the accused by law enforcement officials to conduct legislatively
defined as criminal."
The divergent policy objectives of the majority and minority views are
important to commentators dealing with the theory of criminal law, de-
fendants seeking to develop entrapment arguments, and law enforcement
officers charged with the difficult duty of preventing and imposing sanc-
tions on "invisible"' 2 illegal activities, while remaining within the limits
of acceptable law enforcement practice. The entrapment issue brings into
focus a variety of concerns which society itself must resolve as it defines
the permissible role and functions of its law enforcement institutions. As
courts have attempted to confront these concerns, there has been a nat-
ural tendency to seek general rules applicable in diverse situations. Yet,
inevitably, fact situations arise in which the equities of the case defy black
8 These terms were coined by Chief Justice Warren in Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1958), citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451
(1932) for the underlying rationale. The distinction focuses on whether or not the de-
fendant was disposed to commit the alleged offense at the time the police induced him
to do so.
9 The rule is subjective in the sense that it focuses on the mental state of the de-
fendant at the time he was induced to engage in criminal conduct, rather than on the
objective circumstances of his behavior or that of the authorities. The distinction is
described in these terms by Justice Stewart, dissenting in United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 440 (1973). See also Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 897-99; Note, Entrapment,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (1958). A typical case in which this version of the entrapment
doctrine was applied is United States v. Kros, 296 F. Supp. 972 (E. D. Pa. 1969),
described in note 29 infra.
10 The "objectivity" of the minority test is in its focus on the conduct of law en-
forcement officers in soliciting the criminal behavior of the accused, rather than on
the latter's criminal disposition. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440-41
(1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 899-900.
11 A case illustrating the minority view is United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903
(5th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying note 57 infra.
12 See note 2 supra.
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letter application of the rule. Therefore, the law of entrapment has de-
veloped in ar emphatically case-by-case manner. While past decisions
appear rather unpredictable, the search for generality continues.
A recent manifestation of this search is the case of Russell v. United
States,": which first presented the United States Supreme Court with the
opportunity to resolve the question of whether predisposition of the ac-
cused is an essential and determinative element when the entrapment de-
fense is raised. A five-to-four majority of the Court concluded that it was.
But in spite of the majority's efforts to establish the predisposition con-
cept as dispositive of the defense, the opinion rested on elements of both
the subjective and objective views. Aside from the predisposition issue,
the Court conceded that excessive police conduct may be restrained, in a
proper case, through court refusal to allow convictions that do not com-
port with due process principles. In suggesting that the entrapment doc-
trine has constitutional dimensions, the Court implied that the Russell
decision will be significant not only with respect to the elements of the
entrapment defense, but also with regard to its impact on the role of the
defense in the state courts, where most criminal prosecutions take place.'
4
It is thus of general importance to inquire what the due process standard
will be when the proper case arises. This article responds to this ques-
tion by examining the treatment of federal case law employing the objec-
tive entrapment test, with a view to suggesting some features of a due
process standard that, after Russell, may be imposed upon federal and state
courts faced with an entrapment situation.
I. THE ROOTS OF AMBIGUITY
A. Sorrells v. United States
Ambiguity concerning the policy goals of the entrapment doctrine in
the federal courts is rooted in the leading case of Sorrells v. United
States," in which the Supreme Court first defined and applied entrap-
ment principles. Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, suggested
that a defense of entrapment is presented
when the criminal design originates with the officials of the
Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent per-
son the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its
commission in order that they may prosecute. 16
13 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
14 Unlike federal substantive and procedural law, constitutional principles of due
process are binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment.
15 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The defendant in the case was persuaded to sell bootleg
whisky to a government agent, who had been defendant's comrade in arms during
the First World War. The defendant's reluctance to engage in the transaction was
overcome by appeals to previous friendship. The evidence thus obtained was then
used to convict the defendant for violation of federal liquor laws.
16 Id. at 442.
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The defense was designed to protect defendants who would not have
committed an offense if the idea of doing so had not been engendered by
the government, acting through its agents. 17 Thus, in the words of Chief
Justice Hughes:
The defense is available, not in -the view that the accused,
though guilty, may go free, but that the Government can not
be permitted to contend that he is guilty of a crime where the
Government officials are instigators of his conduct.' 8
The opinion indicated that. the entrapment doctrine was neither judicially
imposed nor based on a constitutional mandate. Rather, the doctrine was
developed because, according to the Court, Congress could not have in-
tended that the accused be found guilty where the government instigated
his criminal behavior.'" However, the Chief Justice's view implied that
the defense was not available to persons already disposed to perpetrate a
crime, who were merely taking advantage of the opportunity presented
by government agents in order to carry out their predisposition.
2 0
In a separate opinion, joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone, Justice
Roberts adopted a broader view of the doctrine that implied a different
policy focus. He observed that the majority rationale, based on a con-
gressional intent judicially inferred to avoid an absurd result. -'-
17 See note 20 infra. See also Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies,
Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provacateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1100-01 (1951); Note.
The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: The Constitutional Basis of the Entrapment
Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942, 943-44 (1965).
18 287 U.S. at 452.
19 The Court observed:
Literal interpretation of statutes at the expense of the reason of the
law and producing absurd consequences or flagrant injustice has
frequently been condemned.
Id. at 446.
We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress
in enacting this statute that its process of detection and enforcement
should be abused by the instigation of government officials of an act
on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its
commission and to punish them. We are not forced by the letter to
do violence to the spirit and purpose of the statute.
Id. at 448.
20 The majority stated:
The predisposition and criminal design of the defendant are relevant.
But the issues raised and the evidence adduced must be pertinent to the
controlling question whether the defendant is a person otherwise in-
nocent whom the Government is seeking to punish for an alleged
offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own of-
ficials.... [I]f the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment
he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his
own conduct and predisposition as bearing on that issue.
Id. at 451.
21 To justify judicial reliance on an unexpressed intent of Congress, Chief Justice
Hughes had noted:
To construe statutes so as to avoid absurd or glaringly unjust results,
foreign to the legislative purpose, is, as we have seen, a traditional
and appropriate function of the courts.
Id. at 450. See note 19 supra.
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amounted to an unnecessary judicial artifice. 22 While the Hughes theory,
adopted by the majority, implied that Congress could nullify the entrap-
ment doctrine by statutory expression of its intent to do so, Mr. Justice
Roberts felt strongly that
[ t I he protection of its own functions and the preservation of the
purity of its own temple belongs only to the court. It is the prov-
ince of the court and of the court alone to protect itself and
the government from such prostitution of the criminal law. The
violation of the principles of justice by the entrapment of the
unwary into crime should be dealt with by the court no matter
by whom or at what stage of the proceedings the facts are
brought to its attention.
2 3
Thus, those justices joining in the separate opinion posited that the rele-
vant question was not whether the accused was somehow "innocent," 24
but whether law enforcement officials had exceeded appropriate bounds in
accomplishing their objectives. The doctrine of entrapment was viewed as
analogous to the equitable and legal principles from which a court derives
authority to refuse to enforce an illegal scheme or a transaction otherwise
in violation of public policy.25 When government conduct is sufficiently
"revolting," in that it amounts to planning and implementing a crime in
order to obtain a conviction, the courts will not grant the government
the fruits of its efforts. 2
6
Under Justice Roberts' rationale, the predisposition of the defendant
still had some relevance to the determination of the propriety of police
conduct. This followed from the minority's definition of entrapment as
the "conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procure-
ment of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except
for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer."' 27 But the minority's
reference to the quasi-equitable judicial power to promote the principles
of justice suggested that the entrapment doctrine is only another means
of controlling law enforcement practices. This analysis suggests that de-
spite the defendant's predisposition, the bounds of propriety might be
exceeded in a particular situation. Therefore, the minority believed a
22 Specifically, Justice Roberts stated, "It is merely to adopt a form of words to
justify action which ought to be based on the inherent right of the court not to be
made the instrument of wrong." Id. at 456.
23 Id. at 457.
24 Since, by hypothesis, the defendant had committed the proscribed conduct, the
Justice felt it would be absurd to conclude that he was innocent. Id. at 456.
25 Id. at 455.
26 As Justice Roberts recognized:
There is common agreement that where a law enforcement officer en-
visages a crime, plans it, and activates its commission by one not
theretofore intending its perpetration, for the sole purpose of ob-
taining a victim through indictment, conviction and sentence, the con-
summation of so revolting a plan ought not to be permitted by any self-
respecting tribunal.
Id. at 454-55.
2 7Id. at 453-54 (emphasis added).
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court should scrutinize law enforcement conduct in any case where gov-
ernment inducement was a sine qua non of the particular offense.
Minority arguments notwithstanding, the majority opinion in Sorrells
was followed by the lower federal courts as the definitive statement of
the entrapment defense. It was generally assumed that a defendant's pre-
disposition would negate any entrapment defense. The decisions, there-
fore, turned on such matters as allocation of the burden of proof, methods
of proving predisposition and government inducement, and standards for
determining the sufficiency of evidence presented by the parties.2 8 A fed-
eral court applying the entrapment doctrine after Sorrells had to find that
the accused was not predisposed to commit the crime at the time of his
inducement by the government.2-
B. Sherman v. United States
The Supreme Court had occasion to reconsider the major policy issues
posed by the entrapment defense in Sherman v. United States.30 But
Chief Justice Hughes' view in Sorrells was accepted by the majority in
Sherman in refusing to reassess the doctrine in terms of Justice Roberts'
analysis. 31 The Court found that the appellant had been entrapped as a
matter of law, since he was not predisposed to commit the crime charged.
As previously noted,32 the Roberts view, though focusing on government
28 See, e.g., United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933); Wall v. United
States, 65 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1933).
29 See, e.g., United States v. Kros, 296 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Defendant
subscribed to a magazine, known as "Swinger's Life," which offered its subscribers
a page of advertising on which they could indicate their particular social tastes and
solicit those of like interests. Agents of the Post Office Department, suspecting the
nature of matter that might ultimately be sent through the mails in response to the
solicitations, advertised in the name of a fictitious couple, suggesting their interest in
obtaining photographs, among other things. Defendant eventually mailed, in re-
sponse to the couple's order, two reels of film which were "obscene, lewd and vile."
He was indicted for sending nonmailable matter through the mails. The court dis-
missed the indictment because of entrapment, finding that defendant was not pre-
disposed to violate the postal laws prior to the agents' inducement.
30 356 U.S. 369 (1958). Appellant was undergoing treatment by a private physician
for addiction to narcotics. He met a fellow narcotics patient, who was also a govern-
ment informer, in the physician's waiting room and at a pharmacy where they both
obtained prescriptions. As the acquaintance developed, the informant repeatedly
asked whether appellant knew of a source of drugs. Appellant, believing the infor-
mant was in distress and not responding to treatment, eventually obtained narcotics
on his behalf. The informant passed information of the transactions to the Bureau
of Narcotics, and appellant was convicted for the illegal sale of narcotics.
31 The majority opinion stated:
It has been suggested that in overturning this opinion we should
reassess the doctrine of entrapment according to principles announced
in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United
States.... To do so would be to decide the case on grounds rejected
in Sorrells and.., not raised here or below by the parties before us....
To dispose of this case on the ground suggested would entail both
overruling a leading decision of this Court and brushing aside the
possibility that we would be creating more problems than we would
supposedly be solving.
Id. at 376-78.
32 See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
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conduct, implied that the defendant's predisposition might be relevant in
determining the propriety of that conduct. The majority opinion in Sher-
man was similarly tinged with the relationship between defendant's predis-
position and the permissibility of police conduct:
The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and
the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does
not include the manufacturing of crime.33
A reference to police conduct was implied in Chief Justice Warren's state-
ment of the issue.3 4 But the majority stopped short of resting the entrap-
ment doctrine on the need to limit law enforcement conduct to acceptable
practices; what was permissible depended on the defendant's state of
mind. There was again a strong minority view.
In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Bren-
nan, Justice Frankfurter repeated Justice Roberts' attack on the majority's
reasoning in Sorrells:
In these cases raising claims of entrapment, the only legislative
intention that can with any show of reason be extracted from
the statute is the intention to make criminal precisely the con-
duct in which the defendant has engaged.3 5
Justice Frankfurter suggested that, when particular conduct is legisla-
tively proscribed, no legislative intent should be inferred beyond the pro-
hibition of exactly that conduct. There is no reasonable basis, he argued,
for concluding that Congress tacitly intended that a non-"predisposed"
actor be found innocent when he engaged in the prohibited conduct.
Furthermore, the minority expressed serious concern about the due pro-
cess implications of focusing on the defendant's predisposition. If the
presence or absence of predisposition in the defendant is crucial to the
success of his entrapment defense, evidence must be adduced which will
permit the trier of fact to establish through inference the defendant's
state of mind prior to the commission of the criminal act. This inquiry
leads to examination of evidence reflecting the defendant's reputation,
past criminal activities, and prior inclination to commit crime. These mat-
ters are not directly related to the elements of the crime in issue. As
Justice Frankfurter observed, "The danger of prejudice in such a situa-
33 346 U.S. at 372.
34 Chief Justice Warren framed the issue as
whether the informer had convinced an otherwise unwilling person to
commit a criminal act or whether petitioner was already predisposed
to commit the act and exhibited only the natural hesitancy of one
acquainted with the narcotics trade.
Id. at 371.
35 Id. at 379. See also the majority opinion in Sherman v. United States:
On the one hand, at trial the accused may examine the conduct of the
government agent; and on the other hand the accused will be subjected
to an "appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and




tion, .. . , is evident."':" The implication of the majority view is that, of
two defendants, one with no past record of criminal disposition and one
with such a history, the latter will be vulnerable to law enforcement
practices tending to cause criminal conduct which would be intolerable
if applied to the former."-, The Sherman minority argued that to allow
such a discrepancy in outcome is to lose sight of the social end to be
achieved by the entrapment defense. Certain police conduct is not per-
missible, and that impermissible quality remains regardless of the inclina-
tions of the charged defendant. :'
The minority wanted the Court to rest the entrapment defense on the
underlying objective of preventing improper police conduct, thereby al-
lowing the courts to administer standards of equity in each case.' The
new policy would minimize reliance on the elusive predisposition element.
plagued as it is with the perils of denial of due process and unequal treat-
ment of defendants in like circumstances. The Frankfurter test would
shift the focus from the state of mind of the individual defendant to the
conduct of the police:
[UI n holding out inducements they should act in such a manner
as is likely to induce to the commission of crime only [those
ready and willing to commit crime] and not others who would
normally avoid crime and through self-struggle resist ordinary
temptations. This test shifts attention from the record and pre-
disposition of the particular defendant to the conduct of the
police and the likelihood, objectively considered, that it would
entrap only those ready and willing to commit crime.40
Justice Frankfurter's sound and vigorous argument notwithstanding,
the majority opinion in Sherman v. United States reiterated the dominant
36 Id. at 382.
37 Id. The concerns, both logical and procedural, expressed by Justices Roberts
and Frankfurter are shared by many commentators. See generally Donnelly, note 17
supra; Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REV.
245 (1942), in which it is suggested that the proper way to control overreaching law
enforcement conduct is to prosecute police officials for the substantive crimes in which
they become involved. This course was actually taken in Reigan v. People, 120
Colo. 472, 210 P.2d 991 (1949), but it seems never to have been adopted by the
federal courts. See also G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 263
(2d ed. 1961); Rotenburg, supra note 6, at 883-89; Note, supra note 17; Comment,
Due Process of Law and the Entrapment Defense, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 821.
38 In Justice Frankfurter's words:
No matter what the defendant's past record and present inclinations
to criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the estimation
of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime
is not be tolerated by an advanced society.
356 U.S. 369, 382-83.
39 As the minority indicated:
The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court must
direct itself, is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular
case falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for the
proper use of governmental power.
Id. at 382.
40 Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
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view: 41 government inducement of defendants to criminal acts should not
be limited except in cases where it could be shown that the particular
defendant was not predisposed to crime. This predisposition rule con-
tinued to be followed in the overwhelming majority of lower federal court
decisions.42 Having found sufficient evidence to infer predisposition, the
courts generally avoided further inquiry into the propriety of government
law enforcement conduct.
C. Federal Cases after Sherman
Reference to selected progeny of the Sorrells and Sherman cases will
demonstrate the calculus of entrapment rules in practice. In United States
ex rel. Toler v. Pate,43 it was enough to support the trial court's inference
of predisposition that the defendant readily accepted a cash offer to pur-
chase narcotics and seemed to have an available supply, in spite of his
lack of prior record or previous grounds for suspicion. 44 In United
States v. Walton,45 the defendant sold heroin to a government agent who
had merely presented opportunities for commission of the offense without
engaging in persuasion. There was also evidence that the defendant was
engaged in the narcotics trade. Under these circumstances, no entrapment
was found. On the other hand, in Carbajal-Portillo v. United States,46 an
unemployed and destitute Mexican citizen desiring to feed his wife and
family, was persuaded to travel a thousand miles from his home near
Mazatlan to sell a quantity of heroin to a United States government agent
in Mexicali, a Mexican city near the California border. The agent per-
suaded him to cross the border and sell the heroin in Calexico, California
instead, where he was arrested for the importation and sale of narcotics.
The court of appeals astutely found that the defendant, though doubtless
predisposed to sell heroin in violation of Mexican law, was not predis-
posed to import or sell it in the United States.
A tempting conclusion from these cases 47 is that, when the Sorrells and
Sherman majority tests are applied, there is an inverse relationship be-
41 The prevailing rule had been adopted in Sorrells and in previous lower court
decisions with the exception of Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d. 993 (5th Cir. 1933)
and Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d. (9th Cir. 1957).42 See note 7 supra.
43 332 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964).
44 A concurring opinion argued that the entrapment defense should be recognized
on due process grounds, since defendant produced evidence showing that the sale was
prompted by his sympathy for what he took to be a dying addict.
The spectacle of the, police hounding a man, not shown to have had
any connection with -the narcotics trade, for more than two months,
with appeals to sympathy and friendship, to obtain the commission
of a crime seemed to me to be a monstrous offense against the ordered
concepts of our constitutional society.
Id. at 427-28. The opinion noted, however, that defendant had an adequate
opportunity to raise this defense in the state courts and failed to do so. Thus it was
not properly raised in the federal courts in a habeas corpus petition.
45 411 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1969).
46 396 F.2d. 944 (9th Cir. 1968).
47 Cf. fact situations in United States v. Kros, 296 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1969),
discussed in note 29 supra; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), discussed




tween a finding of predisposition and the unconscionability of police con-
duct. A court faced with police conduct that is especially reprehensible
seems less likely to find criminal predisposition in the defendant. 48 Con-
versely, the Pate and Walton decisions suggest that clear evidence of the
defendant's predisposition will result in less rigorous judicial scrutiny of
police conduct. This hypothesis might be called into question by a case
such as Pierce v. United States,49 in which predisposition was found when
a government agent initially contacted the defendant, presistently solicited
the sale of counterfeit Federal Reserve notes, and ultimately pursuaded
the defendant to sell, but only after raising the offering price. Bidding for
a commodity like counterfeit currency may not, however, be as uncon-
scionable an inducement to criminality as an appeal to the physical and
emotional factors associated with drug addiction, intimate friendship, or
poverty. These cases indicate that, even in cases adopting the orthodox
view of the requisites of an entrapment defense, there is an analytical
blurring of the doctrines relating to the predisposition of the defendant
and the legitimacy of certain law enforcement conduct. Some federal
courts were unable to insulate themselves from the ambiguities inherent
in the predisposition concept and explored new dimensions of the en-
trapment doctrine in search for sound alternatives.
II. THE DEVELOPING Focus ON GOVERNMENT CONDUCT
In spite of the general post-Sherman focus on defendant predisposi-
tion,50 a marked departure from the norm has occurred in a minority of
federal cases that have allowed an entrapment defense despite the defen-
dant's predisposition. 1 Courts in these cases have scrutinized police con-
duct in light of concerns similar to those bearing on due process ques-
tions. Applied in this manner, the entrapment defense functions primarily
as a curb on improper law enforcement practices. The plight of the en-
trapped defendant, whether predisposed or not, is regarded as potentially
illustrative of the abuse of law enforcement power. Therefore, a court
presented with a defendant whose criminal conduct was induced by gov-
ernment enticement should first examine the quality of police conduct.
In this sense the standard is objective, since it is not concerned with the
defendant's state of mind. The use of this approach was advocated by
the separate opinions of Justices Roberts and Frankfurter in Sorrells and
Sherman respectively and encouraged by the close division of the Su-
preme Court in those cases. Eleven cases have adopted the minority
view. As these cases are examined, it appears that they differ in their
assumptions regarding the sources of judicial authority to limit law en-
forcement activity and the standards to be applied in testing the per-
missibility of that conduct.
48 See Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1968).
49 414 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969).
50 See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
51 Two of these minority view cases actually predate Sherman. See Wall v. United
States, 65 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1933), discussed in text accompanying note 66 infra and
Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957), discussed in text accompanying
note 61 infra.
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The cases comprising this minority may be broadly categorized accord-
ing to two separate analytical approaches. In cases in the larger group,
which are herein termed "single test" cases, the courts conclude at the
outset that the conceptual perplexities and due process ambiguities of the
subjective entrapment test5 2 preclude their examining the predisposition
element and, therefore, test government conduct alone. In the second and
smaller group, "double test" cases, courts share the assumption that the
entrapment defense, properly understood, is negated by the predisposi-
tion of the defendant. But these courts then independently scrutinize the
police conduct; if that conduct is found to be violative of limiting stan-
dards, then the defendant is acquitted in spite of his predisposition.
A. Single Test Cases
The single test group of cases is examined first. Cases in this group
may be divided into two sub-groups, one of which rests the entrapment
doctrine on violation of the court's sensibilities, while the other bases the
analysis on principles of due process. There is also a third sub-group.
herein designated "tentative" because the courts appear to be applying a
single test, but do not unequivocally state whether the defendant's predis-
position is relevant to the availability of the entrapment defense.
1. Appeal to Court's Sensibilities-There are three single test entrap-
ment cases which rest the defense on an appeal to the court's sensibilities.
Williamson v. United States:'" involved a defendant induced by an in-
former who was paid a fee partially contingent on his success in catching
certain big liquor law violators. The conviction was reversed and re-
manded for further evidence to support prior suspicion of his criminal ac-
tivity. Without such evidence, the contingent fee arrangement would be
too easily subject to abuse.54 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
52 See note 9 supra.
53 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962).
54 The court explained:
Without some such justification or explanation, we cannot sanction a
contingent fee arrangement to produce evidence against particular
named defendants as to crimes not yet committed. Such an arrange-
ment might tend to a "frame-up" or to cause an informer to induce or
persuade persons to commit crimes which they had no previous intent
or purpose to commit. The opportunities for abuse are too obvious to
require elaboration.
Id. at 444 (footnote omitted).
A concurring opinion would have recognized a separate, nonentrapment basis for
acquittal:
I do not think ... that this is an aspect of entrapment. Its kinship to
entrapment is not that the act of a Government representative induced
the commission of a crime. Rather, it is that the means used to "make"
the case are essentially revolting to an ordered society.
What we hold is that, recognized as is the role of the informer in the
enforcement of criminal laws, there comes a time when enough is more
than enough-it is just too much. When that occurs, the law must con-





employed the same approach in United States v. Arceneaux,71-' concluding,
after surveying the dichotomous opinions in both Sorrells and Sherman,
that "it is the unbecoming conduct of the Government which calls the
defense of entrapment into play."-" Government conduct was scrutinized
without reference to the defendant's predisposition or corruptibility. The
court did not find it unbecoming that one of the alleged fellow bank rob-
bers had in the past been an informer and was in contact with the FBI
as an informer while the crime was being planned. The informer had
taken no active or organizing responsibility in the execution of the crim-
inal plan, and the court found no entrapment.
In United States v. Bueno, 17 the appellant had been convicted for
narcotics violations based on evidence that he had accepted heroin from
a government agent in Mexico, who had smuggled other heroin into the
United States where he provided it to the appellant. The appellant then
allegedly sold the heroin to another agent. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the defendant had willingly taken part
in the transaction, but held that his willingness was of no importance to
the entrapment defense. Evidence of willingness was held merely to ne-
gate a defense that defendant lacked a criminal motive. But the issue
raised by the entrapment defense, according to the court, was not why
the defendant took part in criminal conduct, but what that conduct was
from the perspective of government participation. '8 "The story takes on
the element of the government buying heroin from itself, through an in-
termediary, the defendant, and then charging him with crime."' 59 This
transaction was held to exceed the "bounds of reason" set by the same
court in Williamson v. United States.60
2. Due Process-The second group, composed of two cases, also ad-
.here to a single objective test for entrapment, but rest the test explicitly
on fifth amendment due process grounds. Prior to the decision in Sher-
man, the Ninth Circuit had held in Banks v. United States," ' without
elaboration, that entrapment would be found according to due process
principles when a defendant was supplied with $70 to procure narcotics
for an agent's "suffering friend," and defendant did so at no profit to him-
self.62 In United States v. Chisum,,5 the District Court for the Central
District of California reached the same result after an especially searching
and scholarly analysis of the theories and rationales previously offered to
55 437 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1971).
56 Id. at 925.
57 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971).
58 Id. at 906.
59 Id. at 905.
60 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962). See text accompanying note 53 supra.
61 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957).
62 Id. at 673. There was evidence that the defendant "had no idea of purchasing
any drug until urged by a Federal government agent." Id. The court made no men-
tion of "predisposition," and it can not be reported whether its absence was, or was
not, an element of the due process argument.
63 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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support the entrapment defense. 64 The court concluded that the grava-
men of the defense is the crime prevention function of the police and the
proper use of government power. Therefore, the defense must prevent
law enforcement activities which tend to manufacture disobedience in
order to punish it, because such procedures are thoroughly repugnant to
constitutional principles. In fact, "[elntrapment is indistinguishable from
other law enforcement practices which the courts have held to violate
due process. Entrapment is an affront to the basic concepts of justice. '65
Thus, the defense was held available in a case where the defendant ac-
tually solicited a police informant to sell counterfeit bills and the police
merely took him up on the proposition by supplying the bills which he
then sold.
3. Tentative-The two cases that together have been characterized as
"tentative" share a common focus on the single test of government con-
duct, but express the entrapment defense in terms which raise the ques-
tion of whether they have really departed from the notion of predisposi-
tion. The first of these was Wall v. United States,66 decided by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals shortly after the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Sorrells. The defendant appealed from his convic-
tion for conspiring to sell narcotics. He argued that his ex-mistress, a gov-
ernment informer known by the defendant to be an addict, induced him
to help her obtain morphine by feigning severe withdrawal symptoms,
and that this was his sole connection with the alleged conspiracy, Citing
Sorrells, the court held that if the government agents who initiated con-
tact between the defendant and the informer had suspected that the
defendant was illegally dealing in narcotics, then the conviction would be
sustained, "although the device employed was exceedingly indecent and
beneath the dignity of the United States ..."67 On the other hand, if the
government, without prior suspicion, had taken advantage of the defen-
dant's sympathies for the plight of his ex-mistress, and the defendant was
not otherwise interested in making the sale, then this government activ-
ity would constitute an entrapment. 68 The case was remanded to deter-
mine the government's prior suspicion of the defendant.
Finally, in Kadis v. United States, 69 the First Circuit applied a single
test which examined whether the government was guilty of corrupting
conduct. The court expounded the predisposition doctrine and then re-
jected it in favor of a single issue, "the ultimate question of entrap-
64 The court discerned five different rationales in the cases and commentaries
including: estoppel of the government to prosecute the criminal it created; a public
policy argument that the police serve no proper function in instigating criminal acts; a
theory of innocence of the entrapped defendant based on the implied intent of
Congress; a theory of judicial discretion to protect the integrity of the courts; and
a constitutional theory of due process. Id. at 1310.
65 Id at 1312.
66 65 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1933).
67 Id. at 994.
68 Id. The court failed to mention the term "predisposition" and it is thus question-
able whether that concept would be equated with "grounds of prior suspicion."
69 373 F.2d 370 (lst Cir. 1967).
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ment."70 That issue was resolved by judging whether the government's
conduct corrupted the defendant in the particular case. The court argued
that the issue had nothing to do with the defendant's predisposition, in
the sense of past record of criminal conduct or criminal proclivities, but
instead amounted to an assessment of his readiness to engage in the spe-
cific conduct for which he was charged seen against the nature and extent
of the police inducement. The distinction seems exceptionally subtle and
defines acceptable police conduct, other than that which might be de-
scribed as offensive per se, 71 with reference to the defendant's state of
mind. Although the standard may be relative, by placing the burden of
proof as to the noncorruptibility of the inducement on the police officials,
the test implied that the character of the police conduct is ultimately to
be judged. 72
In summary, the single test cases taking the minority objective view of
the entrapment issue identified two conceptual sources of legal authority
for judicial review of law enforcement conduct constituting inducement.
One source is the court's role as protector of the integrity of the criminal
justice system. This equity function was clearly discerned by Justice
Roberts in Sorrells. That rationale manifested itself in judicial recogni-
tion of the offensive nature of particular enticement conduct,73 the more
general assessment of the potential for abuse of an investigative process
by "frame-up," 7 4 the overall quantum of criminal creativity engaged in
by the government, 75 and the tendency of law enforcement conduct to
corrupt.76 A second foundation of authority is the due process clause,
which provided the standards applied in Banks and Chisum. Due process
of law precludes police conduct that tends to manufacture crime.
B. Double Test Cases
In the double test group of minority view entrapment cases, the courts,
while focusing on government conduct as ultimately determinative, still
accept the idea that the entrapment defense, properly construed, is avail-
able only to the nonpredisposed defendant. However, a finding of pre-
disposition is not dispositive, for government conduct is to be examined
70 Id at 374.
71 See Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72, 76 (Ist Cir. 1963), discussed in text
accompanying note 89 infra.
72 Neither Wall nor Kadis directly stated the test of offensiveness of government
conduct in terms of the general proposition proposed by Justice Frankfurter in
Sherman, as to whether the inducement would appeal only to those "ready and
willing to commit crime." Sherman v. United States 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1958) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring in result).
73 See Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967), discussed in text
accompanying note 69 supra.
74 See Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962), discussed in text
accompanying note 53 supra and United States v. Bueno, 447 F. 2d 903 (5th Cir.
1971), discussed in text accompanying note 57 supra.75 See United States v. Arceneaux, 437 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1971), discussed in text
accompanying note 55 supra.
76 See Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967), discussed in text ac-
companying note 69 supra.
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in its own right, regardless of the result of the predisposition test. A two-
step analytic process seems to be used in dealing with the defendant's en-
trapment claim. The initial inquiry is whether the defendant was predis-
posed to commit the crime. If he were not predisposed, he would be
acquitted.77 Even if he were found to be predisposed, however, the
propriety of the law enforcement conduct could be separately attacked,
since it might nevertheless preclude the defendant's conviction.
The first case clearly recognizing the alternative "overreaching con-
duct" defense was United States v. Morrison,78 in which the court
adopted a standard for police conduct with attributes similar to the stan-
dards in both Whiting v. United States79 and Accardi v. United States.s0
The question was "whether, in exposing the defendant's criminality, gov-
ernment agents have acted in an offensive manner or lived up to rea-
sonably decent civilized standards for the proper use of government
power.""' This was an alternative standard applicable when the defendant
had been found to be predisposed.8 2 In Greene v. United States' a
federal court adopted the overreaching conduct analysis in a case where
a federal revenue agent had induced defendants to manufacture bootleg
whiskey, by offering to help them obtain a distillery site, still, and oper-
ator, and by furnishing them with 2000 pounds of sugar as raw mate-
rials for the process. Defendants readily acquiesced and had a past his-
tory of convictions for similar criminal conduct. The court focused on the
government's level of "creativity"8 4 in the inducement to criminal con-
duct. Application of this test resulted in the defendants' acquittal, though
the court acknowledged that a '-typical" entrapment defense could not be
sustained in the face of evidence of predisposition. 5
The opinion in Accardi v. United States 6 suggested that government
conduct is overreaching when it is so inappropriate that it must be juci-
cially deterred. The test of overreaching, as articulated by the court, was
whether government agents had manifested "guile and low cunning" ex-
erted for the purpose of enticing into crime "an unwary innocent who
would otherwise have struggled within himself and resisted temptation.
8 7
77 Such a situation would constitute the classic entrapment.
78 348 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1965).
79 321 F.2d 72 (1st Cir. 1963), discussed in text accompanying note 89 in!ra.
80 257 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1958), discussed in text accompanying note 86 infra.
81 348 F.2d at 1004.
82 Id.
83 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
84 Id. at 786.
[W]hen the government permits itself to become enmeshed in criminal
activity, from beginning to end.... the same underlying objections
which render entrapment repugnant to American criminal justice are
operative. Under these circustances, the Government's conduct rises
to a leavel of "creative activity" . . . substantially more intense and ag-
gressive than the level of such activity charged against the Government
in numerous entrapment cases we have examined.
Id. at 787.
85 Id. at 787.
86 257 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1958).
8 T Id. at 173. This obscure set of epithets was generated by both majority and
minority opinions in the Sherman case.
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This language may raise the image of predisposition, depending on
whether the test involves the specific defendant as an unwary innocent or,
in the manner of Justice Frankfurter's approach, unwary innocents gen-
erally. The verbal formulation offered in the case, however, seems to
imply -that government conduct is being judged, even if it is relative, in
some sense, to the defendant's state of mind. In any event, it is clear that
the latter does not dispose of the case. 8
The double test approach also has its "tentative" case. In Whiting v.
United States," ' a government agent gained entry to the defendant's
apartment by representing himself as a friend of the defendant's wife.
Defendant first raised the subject of drugs, and the agent then proceeded
to solicit their sale. Defendant testified that the agent appealed to his
sympathy for the agent's addicted girlfriend, who was said to be suffering
from withdrawal symptoms; this the government denied. The test defined
by the First Circuit Court of Appeals was that, once the defendant showed
he was induced by the government to commit crime, the government
bore the burden of proving "that it [had] engaged in no conduct that was
shocking or offensive per se, and that the defendant was not, in fact, cor-
rupted by the inducement."" In finding the government's conduct not
offensive per se, the court held that there was sufficient testimony from
which the jury could have rejected defendant's assertion that he had been
corrupted. By asking whether the defendant was "corrupted by the in-
ducement," the court was again writing in predisposition terms. But if a
predisposition test is involved, it is combined with the question of whether
the government conduct is offensive per se. The objective element is thus
a part, at least, of the court's approach.
Both groups of minority cases, whether viewing entrapment solely as a
question of inappropriate police conduct or accepting the orthodox en-
trapment doctrine while imposing an alternative standard on official con-
duct, employ a variety of often colorful terms to describe official conduct
which is so objectionable that it must be deterred by judicial proscrip-
tion. Such conduct has been described as government overreaching,"'
government conduct shocking and offensive per se,9 2 government crea-
tivity93 in the inducement of criminal conduct, and the inducement to
crime. 4 It is pointless to attempt a systematic restatement of this ter-
minology in hopes of discerning a technically meaningful set of legal con-
8 ld. at 172-73. By way of historical contrast, the doctrine in the Fifth Circuit
later developed along lines suggested in Williamson and Bueno (discussed in text ac-
companying notes 53 and 57 supra) ultimately incorporating the overreaching conduct
analysis into the entrapment defense itself.
89 321 F.2d 72 (1st Cir. 1963).
90 Id. at 76 (footnotes omitted).
91 Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 1958). See note 87 and ac-
companying text supra.
92 Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 1963). See note 89 and ac-
companying text supra.
93 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932) (see note 20 supra); Greene v.
United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1971) (see note 84 supra).
94 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 442, 451. See text accompanying notes
16-18 supra.
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cepts. The courts appear to have been struggling to describe general legal
principles of ethical, socially acceptable police conduct, while avoiding the
prohibition of particular practices. 95 Although the language seems cryptic,
it indicates that some courts are willing to abandon their doctrinal pre-
occupation with the defendant's predisposition in order to ensure the ap-
plication of a limiting standard with respect to certain types of police con-
duct. The increasing number of schismatic entrapment opinions led the
Supreme Court to reexamine the significance of predisposition.
III. A SYNTHESIS OF POLICY GOALS: UNITED STATES V. RUSSELL
In light of the divergent views expressed by majority and dissent in the
Sorrells and Sherman cases and their progeny, the Supreme Court chose
to reconsider the policy issues raised by the entrapment doctrine in
United States v. Russell.96 Two major issues were considered: first,
whether a finding of predisposition is dispositive of the entrapment de-
fense; and second, if predisposition has been established, whether there
remains an alternative basis for judicially limiting police inducement of
criminal conduct. The defendant in Russell was convicted of illegally
manufacturing, processing, and selling a depressant or stimulant drug.
He had been approached by a special agent of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, who claimed to represent an organiza-
tion seeking to control the illicit manufacture and distribution of meth-
amphetamine on the Pacific coast. The manufacture of methamphet-
amine 97 requires as an essential ingredient a substance known as phenyl-
2-propanone. At the time of defendant's alleged violation, phenyl-2-
propanone was legal to manufacture, sell, and possess, but its purchase
required a manufacturer's license. Its only use was as an ingredient for the
manufacture of methamphetamine. At the request of the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs, most suppliers had agreed voluntarily to
discontinue its sale. The ingredient was therefore extremely difficult to
obtain, legally or illegally. Shapiro, the agent who approached the defen-
dant, offered to supply him with phenyl-2-propanone in return for half
of the methamphetamine to be produced from the propanone by the de-
fendant. Shapiro, in fact, furnished one hundred grams of propanone, re-
ceived half the product, and purchased part of the remaining half for
$60. About a month later, Shapiro returned to the premises where the
manufacture had taken place and asked defendant's accomplice whether
they could continue the arrangement. The accomplice said he had ob-
tained two additional bottles of propanone, but would be interested in
further transactions with Shapiro when they were depleted. The accom-
plice then provided Shapiro with more methamphetamine. Three days
later Shapiro returned with a search warrant and seized an empty 500
95 Practices which might be proscribed, include soliciting the purchase of contra-band from a suspect and appealing to a suspect's known weakness for using drugs,
or to his sympathies for an intimate friend.
96411 U.S. 423 (1973).
97 This drug is described in the vernacular as "speed."
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gram propanone bottle and a 100 gram bottle partially filled with the
chemical, neither bottle being the one the agent had earlier provided.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned defendant's
conviction,98 taking the view that reversal was mandated regardless of
whether one characterized overreaching government conduct as the grava-
men of the entrapment defense9" or as an alternative defense. 100 The
"hopefully unique"''1 1 conduct of agent Shapiro was repugnant to the
criminal justice system, violated fundamental concepts of due process, and
amounted to the kind of overzealous law enforcement conduct which
Justice Frankfurter had sought to prevent in Sherman. 0 2 It was a mat-
ter of creating crime in order to punish it, an activity which cannot be
judicially tolerated regardless of the defendant's predisposition.
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, reversed the court of
appeals. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist noted the recurring
conflict, first engendered by the Hughes-Roberts dichotomy in Sor-
rells, 03 as to whether the proper focus of an entrapment inquiry is the
predisposition of the defendant or the government instigation of the crime.
He concluded that, while the majority views in Sorrells and Sherman had
been subject to criticism for their logical and procedural shortcomings, 10 4
those cases had themselves conclusively responded to the criticisms. 10 5
Furthermore, the arguments supporting the minority view were found sub-
ject to "at least equally cogent criticism."' 1 6 Such criticism is exempli-
fied by Judge Learned Hand's oft-cited concern'1 7 about the extreme
difficulty of obtaining evidence of secret transactions without techniques
of police enticement, and the undesirability of granting immunity from
98 United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 67! (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
99 See United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), discussed in text ac-
companying note 57 supra, and United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D.
Cal. 1970), discussed in text accompanying note 63 supra.
100 See Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971), discussed in text ac-
companying note 83 supra.
101 459 F.2d at 674.
102 Id. at 673-74.
103 See part It supra.
104 These shortcomings consist of the argument from implied congressional intent
that the nonpredisposed defendant induced to crime by the government was "in-
nocent" in spite of his conduct, and the question of whether an accused's predisposition
can be "factually established with the requisite degree of certainty." 411 U.S. at 433.
105 Id. at 434. This contention by Justice Rehnquist is not self-evident, especially
in the case of Sorrells, since the majority in that case did not meet the arguments
against the predisposition doctrine directly. These arguments reached full development
only after Sorrells. In Sherman, the majority refused to reassess the entrapment doc-
trine in light of predisposition difficulties because the question had been neither
briefed nor argued by the parties. 356 U.S. at 376-77.
106411 U.S. at 434.
107 Addressing the issue of police enticement, Judge Hand stated:
Indeed, it would seem probable that, if there were no reply [to the
claim of inducement], it would be impossible ever to secure convic-
tions of any offences which consist of transactions that are carried
out in secret.
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882, cited in
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 377 n.7, cited by Justice Rehnquist in United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. (2d Cir. 1952) 423, 434 (1973).
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prosecution to one who has planned and conceived a crime "simply be-
cause government undercover agents subjected him to inducements which
might have seduced a hypothetical individual who was not so predis-
posed."10 Justice Rehnquist was quick to point out that entrapment is,
as the previous leading cases had established, a "relatively limited def-
ense."101 The defense is not designed to curb excessive government conduct,
but to carry out the intent of Congress as Chief Justice Hughes had de-
scribed it.110
The Court next examined the independent defense accepted in Greene,
which the court of appeals in Russell had suggested was essentially the
same as the entrapment defense because both were "based on funda-
mental concepts of due process and [evinced] the reluctance of the judi-
ciary to countenance 'overzealous law enforcement.' "I" The defendant
had argued in Russell that the due process principles to be applied in the
entrapment case were analogous to those in cases developing the exclu-
sionary rules regarding illegally seized evidence and involuntary confes-
sions.112 Justice Rehnquist distinguished such opinions from the instant
case, stating "the principal reason behind the adoption of the exclusion-
ary rule was the Government's failure to observe its own laws."'11  In
Russell, the Court found neither a violation of an independent constitu-
tional right of the defendant, nor any action by agent Shapiro that could
constitute a violation of federal law.11 4 The majority rejected the argu-
ment that a constitutional rule should preclude defendant's conviotion
because Shapiro had supplied an unavailable essential means to the com-
mission of the crime. The Court acknowledged that even if the diffi-
culties of embodying due process of law in fixed rules could be sur-
mounted by holding, for example, that government provision of a non-
available, essential element to the production of a contraband product
constitutes a per se denial of due process, the facts of this case would
preclude application of such a rule to the defendant. 1 5 For in Russell,
the bottles of propanone seized by Shapiro pursuant to his warrant estab-
lished that the defendant had a source of the chemcial independent of the
government. 1 ' Thus, Shapiro merely provided the chemcial to an en-
terprise already in progress. "The law enforcement conduct here stops far
sholt of violating that fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal
sense of justice, mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. ' 117 Despite the holding in the case, the Court conceded
108 411 U.S. at 434.
109 Id. at 435.
110 Id.
111 459 F.2d at 679, cited in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428 (1973).
112 411 U.S. at 430. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13 411 U.S. at 430, citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
114 411 U.S. at 430.
115Id. at 431.
116 Id.





we may some day be presented with a situation in which the
conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due
process principles would absolutely bar the government from
invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, cf. Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 18
Russell evidently was not that case.
In dissent Justice Douglas, with Justice Brennan concurring, found the
legal availability of phenyl-2-propanone to be irrelevant because the mere
provision of that substance to the defendant for the purpose of creating
a crime was official conduct which would in itself sustain the defense.1 19
Justice Stewart, also dissenting, with Justices Brennan and Marshall, relied
on the objective view rejected by the majority and suggested that be-
cause the propanone was scarce, the government had to provide it to the
accused in order to be certain of obtaining purchased contraband as
evidence. This activity, he argued, constituted government promotion of
crime, -'2 11 which courts should prevent by invoking their power to preserve
the federal institutions of criminal justice. 1 21
Thus, while the majority opinion in Russell definitely established the
relationship between the defendant's predisposition and the availability
of the entrapment defense, four justices in dissent rejected the notion that
the existence of predisposition is dispositive and focused instead on the
conduct of government actors. The majority itself suggested that under
certain circumstances, though undefined, the conduct of government offi-
cials might be such as to require the defendant's acquittal without refer-
ence to his predisposition.
IV. ENTRAPMENT AS A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE
In resolving the question of whether lack of criminal predisposition is a
fundamental prerequisite to assertion of the entrapment defense, the Rus-
sell Court seems clearly to have raised entrapment to constitutional stat-
ure. This proposition may be supported in spite of the majority's asser-
tion that it is a defense of a limited nature,' 22 because the Court specif-
ically observed in Russell that principles of due process might preclude
conviction of an entrapped defendant in a proper case.123 The context
of this observation suggests that the Court was referring to due process
principles which bear on the authorities' inducement of the defendant, and
not merely restating the general proposition that all defendants enjoy the
benefits of due process. Therefore, it no longer seems pertinent to argue
that the entrapment defense is a sui generis phenomenon resting on the
118411 U.S. at 431-32.
119 Id. at 436-39.
120 Id. at 446-50.
121 Id. at 445.
122 The defense is arguably limited because it is based on the congressional intent
perceived by Chief Justice Hughes in Sorrells. See note 19 and accompanying text
supra.
123 411 U.S. at 431-32. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
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implied intent of the legislature and a nonconstitutional concern about the
propriety of allowing crime prevention institutions to create crime. After
Russell, the inquiry in an entrapment case is no longer limited to the
peculiar logical inconsistencies and policy dilemmas raised when police
contribute to conduct which they then prosecute as criminal. The pre-
disposed defendant, denied resort to the conventional entrapment de-
fense, now has available a second attack, though conceivably a difficult
constitutional one, on the particular government action which induced
him to crimnial conduct.
A. Moribund Due Process Claims
Before exploring the content of this due process standard, it might be
well to consider what it does not seem to contain. The majority opinion
in Russell appears to deny the validity of two significant due process
theories that have been put forth in support of the entrapment defense.
The first of these analogizes entrapment cases to cases limiting legislative
power to abolish the mens rea requirement of criminal culpability. 1 24
Under the Russell standard, mens rea is established when the accused
is shown to be criminally predisposed. Retention of the predisposition
element as dispositive of the entrapment defense precludes attacking in-
ducement on this due process ground.
A second argument concludes that due process principles are violated
when the police are intent on inducing a criminal violation for the pur-
pose of prosecution. This argument first posits that the proper limits of
law enforcement conduct are delineated by the necessity of protecting
society's general welfare. Promotion of crime by a police agency could
hardly be conducive to the general welfare. Alternatively, when the police
plan and induce criminal conduct, remaining in such close control of the
situation that society's interests in protecting itself from crime are not
threatened, the defendant has not endangered the social welfare which
the police are to protect. In either event there is no justification, consis-
tent with the proper objectives of law enforcement, for prosecuting the
defendant for his conduct. 125 The response given in Russell is that since
entrapment is justified only where the defendant was criminally predis-
posed, society does have a legitimate interest in promoting the commission
of an invisible crime because evidence may be otherwise unobtainable.
Thus continued reliance on ,the touchstone of predisposition has served
to negate these due process claims.
B. Viable Due Process Claims
Yet other due process claims have been given a new vitality by the
Russell decision. It is probably natural to view specific constitutional pro-
hibitions as the most secure moorings for constitutional doctrine, if only
because specificity implies certainty. Thus it is tempting to analogize the
124 Comment, supra note 37, at 825. See also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
125 Note, supra note 17, at 945-47.
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requirements of due process in the entrapment situation to certain exclu-
sionary rules supported by the fourth amendment prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures,12 6 the fifth amendment right to refrain
from self-incrimination, 127 and the sixth amendment right to be advised
by counsel.' 8 There are numerous instances in which specific law en-
forcement practices, such as search of a premises and seizure of evi-
dence,' coercion of involuntary confessions, and denial of the right to
counsel, 10 have violated these prohibitions. Where such is the case, fed-
eral courts have developed protective doctrines that require suppression
of the evidence acquired. It is clear that the evidence obtained through
the use of entrapment is particularly damaging to the defendant; he sup-
plies the authorities with the corpus delicti and the identity of the perpe-
trator. If the defendant is to be protected by an analogy to the exclusion-
ary rules, some constitutional principle must be adduced to support supres-
sion of the evidence.' 31
One may be entrapped without having one's specific fourth, fifth, and
sixth amendment rights violated in any direct sense. Nothing need have
been seized improperly, nor need the accused have volunteered any oral
or written implicating statements without the formality of waiver.1'32 The
defendant has not necessarily been deprived of the assistance of counsel
in any way that would be relevant had he succumbed to the enticements
of a person other than an agent of government. This is no doubt the im-
port of Justice Rehnquist's distinction between the Russell case and the
exclusionary rule cases on the ground that the government in Russell did
not violate any of its own laws.133 But it would be untenable to suggest
126 The people shall "be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures" and "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
127 No person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
128 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
129 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981
(1966).
130 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
131 Suppression of the evidence gleaned from the entrapment would, in practical
effect, amount to the supression of the charge against the defendant, because that
evidence is by hypothesis the whole basis of the prosecution's case.
132 It has been suggested that there is a similarity between entrapment and the
coerced confession in that the police have somehow overcome the entrapped de-
fendant's reluctance to engage in criminal activity in order to obtain the conduct
which they then prosecute. The difference is essentially in the degree of coercion, the
coerced confession being a "twentieth century form of the rack and thumbscrew,"
with entrapment being something less. Comment, supra note 37, at 825. But the
entrapped defendant has done more than confess, he has acted out the corroboratory
conduct to the confession at the behest of the authorities. If that conduct were truly
involuntary, then lack of inens rea might be a defense. If the conduct were voluntary,
the fifth amendment would not protect the accused from a submission against him of
any evidence freely given.
133 Agent Shapiro's act consisted of supplying material, which was not in itself
illegal in spite of his representations to the defendant of the purposes of the trans-
action. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
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that all entrapment cases are so distinguishable. In many cases the gov-
ernment has engaged in conduct that is expressly criminal, and would, no
doubt, support a charge of conspiracy against the government's agents if
they were acting in any other capacity. The Court in Russell fails to re-
solve the question presented in those cases, but it has seemingly raised
the entrapment defense to an appeal to the community sense of jus-
tice. 1 4 The analogy to the exclusionary rule remains relevant if such an
appeal yields the conclusion that government conduct which violates the
law is so fundamentally unfair that it is similar to the violation of a defen-
dant's specific constitutional rights and, through -that analogy, a denial of
due process of law.
The Russell majority suggested that there is a judicial reluctance to
embody the entrapment doctrine in specific prohibitions';- and thereby
express due process principles in the form of "fixed rules."'1:" For this
reason, the Court may have rejected the specific notion that government
provision of an otherwise unavailable, yet necessary, element of crime is
by nature a violation of fifth amendment due process. 1'37 For the same
reason, it is not clear that this rejection was given the status of a general
rule.'"" The dissenting opinion would have given a different legal sig-
nificance to the limited availability of phenyl-2-propanone. 1'3 9 In the end,
Justice Rehnquist concluded that this question was irrelevent because the
essential element of the crime, official conduct aside, was in fact other-
wise available to the defendant.
In a case where the essential element of the crime was not otherwise avail-
able to the accused, United States v. Dillett,140 an acquittal on the
grounds of entrapment was reached. The court there held that provision
of narcotics to the defendant followed by resale to a government agent
proved that the criminal disposition was in the government, not in the
accused. It is speculative whether Justice Rehnquist might have reached
the same result in Russell had he perceived the facts differently. That
would, of course, be a different case. Yet one must wonder whether, given
an appropriate set of facts, government provision of an otherwise unavail-
able element of a crime might trigger a constitutional finding of entrap-
ment141 even under the Rehnquist test, the majority's dictum notwith-
134 See note 147 and accompanying text inira.
135 See part II supra.
136 See text accompanying notes 115-116 supra.
137 "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
138 See text accompanying notes 115 supra and 142 inIra.
139 See text accompanying notes 115. 119, and 120 supra.
140 265 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
141 This caveat may be tempered by the Supreme Court's memorandum opinion in
United States v. McGrath, __ U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 2769 (1973). The defendant was
convicted of unlawful possession of counterfeit obligations. It was proved at trial
that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crimes charged, but that the gov-
ernment had infiltrated the conspiracy and then gained "substantial control" over the
scheme, including the supervision of the actual printing of counterfeit bills. United




The specific point of reference, which the Russell majority did hold out
as illustrative of the type of law enforcement conduct that it is the role of
the constitutional entrapment doctrine to prevent, 14 : was the case of
Rochin v. California.' 44 The Rochin case presented a hopefully unusual
example of extreme police conduct. Officers had forcibly entered defen-
dant's bedroom without a warrant, physically assulted him in an unsuc-
cessful effort to prevent him from swallowing morphine capsules observed
on a nightstand, and immediately transported him against his will to a
hospital where his stomach was pumped to obtain the evidence. In a fed-
eral court the warrantless search and seizure would have precluded the
use of the evidence so obtained.' 4 ' Since the exclusionary rule for ille-
gally seized evidence had not yet been extended to the states, 146 the
Court explored the reaches of fourteenth amendment due process as a
limitation on state law enforcement conduct. The Court concluded that
the due process clause embodies the heritage of a legal tradition "so
rooted in the... conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal,"' 147 requiring that prosecutorial efforts "respect certain decencies of
civilized conduct." 14s Law enforcement officials, therefore, must conduct
themselves within the confines of a "community sense of fair play and
decency,"'1 49 stopping short of actions which "discredit law," 15 "brutal-
ize the temper of a society,"'' or shock the conscience of justice.
Thus stated, the due process standard in the context of the entrapment
situation, if an objective test, represents a subjective judgment. 1 2 In-
deed, Justice Frankfurter recognized as much in Rochin:
cluded that there could be no predisposition as a matter of law "where the Govern-
ment itself performs essential parts of a criminal offense that might otherwise not have
been committed." 468 F.2d at 1029-30. But the court also found that "the Govern-
ment's activities in the instant case [were] 'shocking to [the court's] sense of justice.' "
468 F.2d at 1030. The conviction was reversed. The Supreme Court vacated thejudgment and remanded the case to the court of appeals "for further consideration in
light of United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423." 93 S. Ct. at 2769.
142 411 U.S. at 43 1. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
143 411 U.S. at 431-32. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
144 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
145 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
146 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). This exclusionary rule was subse-
quently extended to the states when Wolf was overruled in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
147 342 U.S. at 169, citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
148 342 U.S. at 173.
149 Id. at 173.
150 id. at 174.
151 Id. at 172.
152 "Subjective" in the sense used here refers to the court's own notion of when
police conduct is fundamentally fair and decent and thus within the limits implied
by the due process clause. The subjective reaction of a court is to be distinguished
from the subjective-objective dichotomy descriptive of the kinds of entrapment tests
suggested by different schools of thought on that subject (see notes 9 and 10 supra).
In that context it will be recalled that "subjective" refers to a primary concern with
the defendant's predisposition, and "objective" to an emphasis on law enforcement
practice.
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In each case "due process of law" requires an evaluation based
on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a
balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the de-
tached consideration of conflicting claims .... 153
Though this description of the inquiry would appear to be imprecise,
Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle, pre-
cludes defining and thereby confining, these standards of con-
duct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be
brought about by methods that offend a "sense of justice. ' ' r54
V. CONCLUSIONS
While Russell has reaffirmed the predisposition focus of the orthodox
entrapment doctrine, the case has made it equally clear that federal and
state government inducement of criminal conduct as an evidence-gather-
ing technique is subject to constitutional due process limitations. 155 As
yet these due process principles have not taken the form of prohibitions
on particular kinds of police conduct. Particular prohibitions may never
evolve, and it might well be questioned whether they should, given the
conceptual perplexities and conflicting equities generated in the entrap-
ment situation, a context which necessarily varies from case to case.
Courts cannot be expected to develop a unitary constitutional theory of
entrapment that treats criminal predisposition as irrelevant. But defense
counsel will surely attack the due process issue with vigor, as an alterna-
tive defense, once the evidence has forced them to concede on the issue
of predisposition. 1 6 The analytical result, unless the Supreme Court later
entirely withdraws due process support from the entrapment doctrine,
should be similar to that in the Banks"7T and Chisum1 5s cases, for the
conscience of the community has been set forth as the applicable due
process standard by the Supreme Court's reference to Rochin in Rus-
sell.159
153 Id. at 172.
154 Id. at 173.
155 See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
156 This approach was taken in United States v. Anderson, Criminal No. 602-71
(D.N.J. May 20, 1973), decided by jury verdict shortly after the Supreme Court's
Russell decision. The trial judge, in light of Russell, agreed to charge the jury that
if you find that the overreaching participation by Government agents
or informers in the activities as you have heard them here was so
fundamentally unfair as to be offensive to the basic standards of
decency, and shocking to the universal sense of justice, then you may
acquit any defendant to whom this defense applies.
The judge distinguished this defense from the predisposition-oriented entrapment
defense, upon which a separate charge was given.
157 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957). See text accompanying note 61 supra.
158 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970). See text accompanying note 63 supra.
159411 U.S. at 431-32.
[VOL. 7:361
WINTER 1974] Entrapment Defense 387
The law enforcement conduct in Rochin was clearly excessive. Most
situations in which police conduct approaches entrapment are much more
ambiguous. But factual ambiguity enhances the need for sharp judicial
scrutiny of particular cases. The language used by courts may change,
but it is not a difficult jump in legal semantics from unbecoming conduct,
overreaching, and offensiveness per se, to the language of due process.
-Robert H. Thomson, III
